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Looking afresh at the external representation of 
the EU in the international arena, post-Lisbon* 
Michael Emerson and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński 
 
 
n the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, it is important 
to review the present arrangements for the 
institutional representation of the European 
Union in international organisations, and more 
broadly, in the processes of international 
negotiations and the way the EU acts as 
contracting party to conventions of international 
law. 
The subject is ripe for attention for two reasons. 
First, while the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty 
enhance the institutional role of the EU in foreign 
and security policy, these issues of external 
representation still need to be followed through 
(beyond the setting up of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS)).
1 With the EU having 
gained an international legal personality, the 
nameplate “European Union” has replaced that of 
“European Commission” in various forums. This 
marks the point at which the EU takes on more of a 
‘state-like’ political character. But beyond the 
symbolism of the nameplate there are many 
complex and substantive matters to be tackled.  
The complexity is due to the growth of EU 
competences in the several treaty revisions since 
the 1980s, and their multiple legal and institutional 
                                                      
*  The present note represents the beginnings of a new 
project being undertaken by a working group consisting of 
CEPS, EPC, the Egmont Centre and the Leuven University 
Centre for Global Governance Studies. 
1 The setting up of the EEAS, currently underway, is a 
largely complementary topic to the present one. 
types (exclusive and shared competences, the 
three-pillar structure revised to two by Lisbon, the 
‘mixed agreements’ etc.). The EU’s enlargement 
has also meant that various aspects of the status 
quo have become increasingly cumbersome and 
obsolete (e.g. constituencies on the IMF board that 
mix EU and non-EU states; or the numerical 
dominance of the EU member states in the Council 
of Europe and OSCE alongside the weak observer 
status of the EU itself). 
Second, and following on from the issues of 
obsolescence, there is the question of how the EU 
can advance its declared foreign policy priority 
objective of ‘effective multilateralism’. It is 
increasingly apparent that the EU now has to shape 
up its external representation in order not to 
prejudice this objective. President Obama’s 
attitude comes to mind. He has a strong political 
preference for multilateralism, in contrast to his 
predecessor, yet he is also constantly looking for 
mechanisms that work, and will side-step 
institutions that are cumbersome and inefficient (as 
illustrated by the ad hoc formats that emerged at 
the Copenhagen climate change summit in 
December 2009). This links to issues that come 
with the rise of new global powers that seek 
stronger voting weights in multilateral 
organisations. The most recent Brazil-Russia-
India-China (‘BRIC’) summit in April 2010 was a 
clear manifestation of this. Here, the over-
representation of EU member states is the other 
side of this same coin, and has to be faced up to in 
some way. 
I 
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The EU’s concerns are thus part of the broader 
international concern for more effective global 
governance. The UN system now has nearly 200 
member states, with the EU programmed to 
enlarge further, at least in the Balkans, from 27 to 
over 30. These large numbers make decision-
making unwieldy unless there are two- or multi-
tier structures, analogous to the governance of big 
companies which have many sovereign 
shareholders, a more limited board of directors, 
and often an even more limited executive board or 
committee. The G7/8/20 and UN Security Council 
are the most important examples of restricted 
groups, but the former are only semi-
institutionalised and ad hoc and the latter limited in 
its field of competence. In any case, the EU and its 
member states will have a huge responsibility for 
helping (or blocking) developments towards a 
more effective multilateral order. Some US 
analysts who take a pessimistic view of the 
capacity of multilateral organisations to adapt 
argue for a ‘mini-lateral’ rather than ‘multilateral’ 
system, i.e. for shifting the main action in 
international affairs to coalitions of small numbers 
of relevant and like-minded states.
2 If this were to 
become a real trend, how would the EU and its 
member states work with it? 
The EU institutions and member states are at work 
on the first and most obvious steps to implement 
the Lisbon Treaty, with the formation of the 
European External Action Service, and various 
pressing issues that demand solutions now. But this 
complex and onerous process will take some time, 
and the institutions may not address the issues of 
external representation in any comprehensive or 
profound way in the near future. On the other 
hand, there is an evident awareness that these 
issues will have to be confronted as time goes on.  
Lisbon implications 
The key issue is how the external representation of 
the EU can be strengthened in line with the 
institutional advances of the Lisbon Treaty, with 
the striking of new balances between the EU 
institutions and its member states, taking account 
of the pressures created by the combination of EU 
enlargement and the rise of new global powers. 
                                                      
2 Moises Naim, “Minilateralism - The Magic Number to 
Get Real International Action”, Foreign Policy, 
July/August 2009. See also Richard Haas, “A waning 
Europe means less to America”, Financial Times, 13 May 
2010. 
What is lacking so far is a systematic or strategic 
review of the status quo; a coherent rationale for 
the progressive strengthening of the EU’s 
presence, in line with its competences. The starting 
point is the Lisbon Treaty and the articles that 
concern foreign and security policy, and those that 
catalogue the competences of the European Union 
(TFEU Articles 3, 4, 5, 6) with the graduation of 
competences (exclusive or shared competences, 
areas for coordination or supporting actions, etc). 
We reproduce the listing of the EU’s competences 
of these several types (exclusive, shared, etc.) in 
the Annex, and then locate selected international 
organisations and conventions within these 
categories. In principle this should provide an 
overview of the questions of EU representation and 
that of the member states in the various 
configurations, which we list below.  
Models of EU and member state 
participation in multilateral 
organisations 
There are several models of representation of the 
EU and its member states in international 
organisations; as contracting parties to conventions 
of international law, and in semi-institutionalised 
summit processes: 
•  All member states as full members, the 
EU/EC as observer. This is the most prevalent 
model with global multilateral organisations. 
However, this does not prevent the leadership 
of the EU institutions from concerting in semi-
institutionalised modes with their opposite 
numbers of international organisations, without 
the presence of member states (e.g. in the cases 
of the Council of Europe and the IFIs – 
international financial institutions).  
•  All member states plus the EU/EC as full 
members. Where EU competences are 
particularly important, such as for trade (WTO) 
and agriculture (FAO), the Commission has full 
status alongside member states.  
•  Some member states plus the EU/EC as full 
participants. This is prevalent in less 
formalised semi-institutions, such as G7/8/20 
where the larger member states are present, 
together with the EU as more or less full 
participants with both the Council Presidency 
and the Commission.  
•  EU/EC as full member/contracting party, 
with no member states. This is mostly seen in 
the case of highly specialised international 
agreements, such as for individual agricultural 
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•  Some member states as full members; the 
EU/EC with no status. The UN Security 
Council is a special case with two member 
states (F, the UK) as permanent members, and 
others taking only occasional places in rotation, 
and the EU not even present as an observer. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty has an arrangement 
whereby the EU can be invited to express 
common positions. 
•  Constituency arrangements and voting 
weights. In some organisations there are 
constituency arrangements (IMF, IBRD 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development), EBRD (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development)) for 
grouping the smaller member states, and in 
these cases the additional issue of voting 
weights arises. The constituencies of the IMF 
and World Bank are now mostly anomalous in 
ignoring the enlargement of the EU.  
Negotiating formats for shared 
competences  
The question of who negotiates for the EU is 
related to, but not entirely the same matter as that 
of membership (or not) of multilateral 
organisations. Articles 216-219 of the TFEU set 
out details of the procedures for the Council to 
give negotiating mandates to the negotiator, 
entrusts the Commission or the High 
Representative to make recommendations as to 
who should be the negotiator, but gives no further 
clarification on the profile or identity of the 
negotiator. The most complex situations arise 
where the EU and MS have shared competences, 
or mixes of exclusive and shared competences. 
There are cases where such arrangements have 
been worked out in an apparently satisfactory 
manner. For example in the UN FAO (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation), at meetings with 
multiple agenda points, the EC/EU and member 
states make declarations at the beginning on who is 
competent for what among the Commission and 
Council rotating Presidency and member states. 
However there are other instances of organisations 
and conventions in which the EU has shared 
competences, and the status quo is either messy or 
uncertain, and in some cases currently being tested 
‘post-Lisbon’ for possible changes in the 
distribution of roles between the institutions, for 
example in the environment field for climate 
change (post-Copenhagen) and the current UN 
Environment Programme-Mercury negotiations.  
 
In lieu of a conclusion 
It would be premature to draw precise conclusions 
on a project that will be ongoing until the end of 
2010, when it should see a substantial publication 
with recommendations. The first task is to 
complete a reasonably thorough stock-take of the 
status quo of the EU’s external representation. This 
will analyse the various forms of representation of 
the EU alongside the several categories of EU 
competence, building on the framework set out in 
the Annex. A second task will be to consider how 
the status quo is being changed, or needs to be 
changed, in order to reflect the provisions and 
intentions of the Lisbon Treaty. A third task will be 
to clarify the principles to give coherence to the 
EU’s forms of representation according to the 
extent of the EU’s competences. A fourth task will 
be to identify cases where the status quo 
arrangements are obsolete, anomalous or 
inefficient, and deserve reconsideration and 
change. Finally, the intention is to present a 
strategic view of the subject matter, i.e. to set out 
what the EU would need to do to its external 
representation to be effectively equipped as a 
global international actor in the emerging multi-
polar world.  
In general, this will require an extensive ‘upgrade’ 
of the EU’s external representation, which often 
languishes in the rank of observer even where its 
competences may be substantial. This is a highly 
complex field, however – politically, legally and 
institutionally – and any attempt to formulate 
operational recommendations will have to be finely 
tuned to many different specific situations. Any 
ideas and suggestions from those with relevant 
experience will be most welcome.  4 | Emerson & Kaczyński 
Annex: Competences of the European Union according to the Lisbon Treaty, and 
participation of EU institutions in related international organizations and conventions 
Competences  Organisations, Conventions  Status of EC & Member States 
UN General Assembly  EC observer; MS as members 
UN Security Council  2 permanent MS+ rotating 
OSCE  EC observer, MS as members 
NATO  24 MS as members 
Non-Proliferation Treaty  EAEC signatory & MS 
Council of Europe  EC observer, MS as members 
Foreign, security and defence 
policies (including general 
political affairs) 
G7/8/20  EC participant, some MS 
1.  Exclusive (Article 3)     
a.  Customs union  World Customs Org. (WCO)  Member 
b.  Competition policy  World Intellect. Property Org.(WIPO)  Observer 
IMF  ECB observer, MS as members 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)  ECB on Board, some MS 
c.  Monetary policy 
(for eurozone) 
OECD  EC observer, 21 MS as members 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas 
EC & MS as members 
UN Conference on Highly Migratory Fish   EC & MS as members 
Multiple regional fisheries organizations: 
Mediterranean, NE Atlantic, NW Atlantic, SE 
Atlantic, Antarctic, Western and Central 
Pacific 
EC Member & some MS 
d.  Fisheries & marine 
biological policies  
Organizations for species: tuna, salmon  EC signatory & some MS 
WTO  EC & MS as members  e.  Trade policy  
UN Comm.on Internat.Trade Law (UNCITRAL)  EC observer, some MS as members 
2.  Shared (Article 4)      
International Standards Organization (ISO)  EC cooperation, MS as members  a.  Internal market 
Codex Alimentarius Commission  EU & MS as members 
b.  Social policy  International Labour Organization (ILO)  EC observer, MS as members 
c.  Cohesion (regional)     
FAO  EC & MS as members 
International Fund for Agricultural Develop.  EC observer, MS as members 
d.  Agriculture and forestry 
Multiple product organizations: Olive oil, Sugar, 
Cocoa, Coffee, Jute, Tropical Timber, Rubber, 
Grains, New varieties of plants 
EC & some MS as members 
UN Environmental Program   EC observer, some MS as members 
UN FCCC (climate change)  EC & MS as members 
Kyoto Protocol   EC & MS as members 
UN Conference on Environmt. and Develop.  EC & MS as full participants  
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)  EC & MS as members 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea  EC & MS as members 
International Seabed Authority  EC & MS as members 
Protection Marine Environmt. of N. Atlantic  EC & 12 MS as members 
e.  Environment 
Protection of the Danube River  EC & 6 MS as members 
f.  Consumer protect.  -  - 
International Civil Aviation Organiz. (ICAO)  EC observer, MS as members  
International Maritime Organization (IMO)  EC observer, MS as members 
g.  Transport 
Eurocontrol  EC & 21 MS as members 
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  EC observer, MS as members 
International Energy Agency (IEA)  EC participates; 17 MS as members 
i.  Energy 
Energy Charter Treaty  EC and MS as members 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)  -  
International Criminal Court (ICC)  EU cooperation agreement 
European Convention of Human Rights  EU & all MS as acceding parties 
UN High Commission for Refugees  EC observer, MS as members 
World Conf. against Racism, Racial Discrim.   EC & MS as full participants  
Fourth World Conf. on Women  EC & MS as full participants 
UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic of Drugs  EC & MS as full members 
j.  Freedom, security 
and justice 
UN Convention Against Transnational Crime  EC & MS as full members 
k.  Public health, safety  -  - 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)   EC sector memb., MS as members 
Outer Space Treaty  EC observer, most MS as members 
World Summit on the Information Society  EC & MS as full participants 
International Fusion Energy Org. (IETR)  EAEC member, no MS 
l.  Research, Technology, 
Space 
Science and Technical Center in Ukraine  EAEC & EC member, no MS 
World Bank  - 
World Food Programme (WFP)  EC & many MS as donors 
UNDP  EC observer, MS as members 
UNCTAD  EC observer & partial member 
World Summit on Sustainable Development  EC & most MS as full participants 
UN Conference on Least Developed Countries  EC & most MS as full participants 
m.  Development and 
humanitarian aid 
World Food Summit  EC & most MS as members 
3.  Coordination (Article 5)      
EBRD  EEC & MS as shareholders  a.  Economic policies 
OECD  EC observer, 21 MS as members 
b.  Employment policies  ILO  EC observer, MS as members 
c.  Social policies  ILO  EC observer, MS as members 
4.  Supplementary (Article 6)     
World Health Organization (WHO)  EC observer, MS as members  a.  Human health 
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)  EC observer, MS as members 
UN Industrial Development Org. (UNIDO)  Partnership; most MS as members  b.  Industry 
Multiple Organizations for commodities: Nickel, 
Copper, Lead and Zinc 
EC & some MS as members 
c.  Culture  UNESCO  EC observer, MS as members 
d.  Tourism  UN World Tourism Organization  Most MS as members 
UNESCO  EC observer, MS as members  e.  Education, training, 
youth, sport  UNICEF  EC observer, MS as members 
 
Source: Own compilation. 